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1 Introduction
Much has been written about Sierra Leone’s
security sector reform (SSR), after the country’s
civil war officially ended in 2002. The Sierra
Leone Police (SLP), in particular, has received
much attention (Meek 2003; Baker 2005, 2006;
Gbla et al. 2009; Albrecht and Jackson 2009;
Albrecht 2010). This article documents the
process from the perspective of Sierra Leonean
Police officers who were key to the reform.1 It
covers the aspects of the political and police
force environment that helped engender change,
as well as constraints faced. It considers how the
officers actually carried out the task at hand,
what reform tactics worked and which were more
problematic. 
The article begins with a background to the SLP,
particularly in the run-up to the country’s civil
conflict, which began in 1991. It then documents
the journey of the SLP through the conflict, and
the origins of the reform process. The experience
of reform is then discussed. Finally, we discuss
the challenges that the SLP still faces and
conclude by drawing out key lessons.
2 Background to the SLP
The Sierra Leone Police has its origin in the
West Africa Frontier Force which, between 1863
and 1906, was responsible for maintaining
Britain’s colonial frontier in the region, and
maintaining law and order (essentially armed
resistance against Britain’s attempt to govern its
Protectorate). From 1906 the force was modelled
after the British police force and became part of
the colonial civil service. Local officers were sent
on various training programmes in Britain
and/or other colonial territories. The Force was
considered one of the best and well disciplined
forces in colonial British West Africa.
The SLP gradually evolved over the years, and
assumed the status of a community security
force, moving away from a role that mainly
consisted of defending British colonial interests.
But it was a wholly colonial instrument, with its
senior ranks staffed by retired and seconded
British officers. Between 1955–56, the force was
twice highly commended by Royal Commissions
for its excellent handling of civil disturbances in
Freetown and the provinces. 
However, during this period, Sierra Leone began
moving towards Independence, with indigenous
Africans beginning to take on significant roles in
government and the civil service. This included
the SLP, and by the time of Sierra Leone’s
independence in 1961, the force had virtually
been Africanised. In 1963 the first Sierra
Leonean Commissioner of Police was appointed. 
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In 1964, Parliament passed an Act to consolidate
and amend the ‘Law relating to the
Organisation, Discipline, Power and Duties of
the Police’, setting up, among other things, a
Police Council, with the Minister of the Interior
as Chairman. This Act further defined the roles
of the Sierra Leone Police Force as ‘The
detection of crime and the apprehension of
offenders, the preservation of Law and Order,
the protection of life and property, and the due
enforcement of all Laws and Regulations with
which they are directly charged’ (The Sierra
Leone Police Act, Act No 4 of 1964). 
While before and shortly after Independence, the
police force maintained a neutral role in national
politics, with the consolidation of power by then
President Siaka Stevens, and the introduction of
the One-Party Constitution in 1978, its role was
radically altered and compromised. The
Commissioner of Police was made a member of
the ruling party, a nominated Member of
Parliament and a Cabinet Minister. This marked
the turning point in the history of the force. The
period also witnessed the change of
nomenclature from Commissioner of Police to
Inspector General of Police (IG), in 1985. This
politicised position of the IG created imbalances
in the political allegiance, which had far-
reaching effects on police recruitment
procedures, management, administration and
promotion. This lowered ethical standards and
morale, contributed to a breakdown of discipline,
and encouraged corruption. This also jeopardised
police credibility among the citizenry.
As a result, most Police Officers developed a
lackadaisical attitude towards their job, further
eroding public confidence. This collective lack of
confidence found expression in indifferent
attitudes and even greater ineffectiveness in
police service delivery.
The government did make some attempts to
reverse the decline of the police. For instance, in
1984 a Cadet Officer Programme was instituted
to promote recruitment among university
graduates. The policy may have been instigated
by Stevens in an attempt to limit the pressures
exerted by members of his party to provide jobs
for their dependants. The programme ensured
that graduates would enter the police force at the
relatively senior rank of Cadet Assistant
Superintendents. The recruitment was somewhat
successful, with 18 graduates from different
backgrounds joining in the inaugural year. 
The nature of their recruitment had made them
household names. As Chris Charley, one of the
18, notes:
The police force at this time was perceived to
be an organisation that attracted only
mediocre people, so when the 18 of us came
in, overnight we started getting attention –
the media zoomed in on the SLP to see how
these new graduates were getting on and what
changes they would bring to the police force…
the limelight was on us; anything we did came
within the public domain and it has its own
advantages and disadvantages (Charley,
interview, 2010).
With regard to relations with other members of
the police, however, there were distinct
disadvantages. In a context where officers were
threatened with dismissal for attempting to hold
on to the basic competencies of the profession,
corruption-resistant police often found their
promotion blocked. At one point, most of the
cadre that entered in 1984 found their expected
promotion to the position of Deputy
Superintendent of Police blocked for four years.
With ambitious officers being held back, the
force continued its downward spiral. This general
malaise was reflected in all aspects of civil
service and government conduct, considered to
be one of the main contributing factors to the
Sierra Leone conflict that broke out in 1991. As
direct representatives of a corrupt and
ineffective government, police personnel and
buildings were a particular target of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency.2
In 1992, junior elements of the army staged a
coup against the Joseph Momoh government,
which had taken over one-party rule from
Stevens in 1985. After the coup it was clear that
the sympathies of the military administration
rested with certain elements of the police,
particularly those whose progress had been
restricted, and with whom they had close
professional relations. This was demonstrated by
the new administration’s double promotion of
those officers that had been constrained by the
political machinations of the previous
government.
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By the outbreak of the civil war in 1991 then, it
was clear that the police were a wholly
demoralised, heavily politicised and
unprofessional force. The war, however, gave
some elements a sense of purpose, fighting
alongside the army, a relationship that
strengthened once the army assumed power in
1992. However, the military regime, enjoying the
windfalls associated with being in government,
soon began to behave like its predecessors,
contributing to the further de-professionalisation
of the Police, to the extent that senior elements
became involved in wide-scale forgery and
mismanagement. On the eve of Sierra Leone’s
return to democratic multi-party rule, the SLP
was rife with corruption, devoid of legitimacy
and teetering on the brink of decay.
3 Initiating reforms
As part of the move towards returning the
country to democracy in 1996, several advisory
councils were set up. One such body was the
Advisory Council on the Present and Future
Challenges of the Sierra Leone Police Force,
headed by Dr Alhaji Tejan Kabbah, a former
lawyer and retired senior United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) official. 
The Advisory Council recommended:
z a restoration of the friendly image of the
police, to ensure good community relations;
z the establishment of a planning unit that
would be able to project the training and
equipment needs of the police force;
z the establishment of a Police Council (a
provision contained in Section 156 of Act No 6
of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone),
with powers to make recommendations on
policy issues affecting the police;
z SLP decentralisation, with an Inspector
General, a Deputy Inspector General and a
Senior Commissioner at the headquarters in
Freetown, and officers at each provincial level,
and at divisional headquarters;
z trimming of the SLP’s ranks, keeping only
essential, positively functional policemen;
z expanding the system of promotion and
exams, and encouraging the intake of capable
university graduates by raising their points of
admission to Cadets Officers;
z equipping the force adequately to enable it to
operate efficiently, by improving the
emolument and conditions of service of officers.
Kabbah was elected as Sierra Leone’s President
in 1996. As former chairman on the Police
Advisory Council, a priority was to ensure that
the recommendations of the Council were taken
forward.
The Police Council was established under the
Chairmanship of the Vice-President, Dr Albert
Joe Demby. The Council developed a working
document titled ‘Policing Ethics’ – a
12-paragraph booklet setting the standards for
the performance of Police Officers to meet by
the new millennium. Furthermore, Regional
Commissioners were appointed for the North,
South and Eastern Provinces.
In its efforts, the government was supported by a
number of development partners including,
significantly, the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and UNDP.
Other agencies and International Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), such as
ActionAid, supported the rehabilitation of police
infrastructures. Reputable national management
organisations, such as the Institute of Public
Administration and Management (IPAM) and
CORD-Sierra Leone, also provided the SLP with
training and materials. 
Plans were derailed by a coup d’état on 25 May
1997, by rebel elements of the Sierra Leone Army
(SLA), who collaborated with the RUF to create a
joint Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC)-RUF regime. It was common practice for
invading rebels to target and eliminate
established law enforcement groups in order to
establish their primacy so upon entering Freetown
their first activities included targeting the police
and the prisons, releasing many prisoners. The
military junta viewed the police with suspicion for
having collaborated with the overthrown
government and senior officers were summoned
to the Cockerill Military Headquarters and
warned against feeding information to the now-
exiled government in Guinea.
Many senior Police Officers fled the country. But
despite the difficult period some of those with
integrity found a way to stay, realising the need to
provide leadership, particularly given that within
the military regime, it was virtually non-existent.
The Deputy Inspector General, Kandeh Bangura
deserves particular mention; many Police
Officers feel that if he had left, the integrity of
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the state would have been completely destroyed.
Although Bangura was from the Limba ethnic
group and therefore close by association to the
Limba-dominated junta leadership, he was not
considered to be a junta supporter.
The Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) eventually
drove the AFRC-RUF alliance out of Freetown in
March 1998 and restored the Kabbah
government to power, which continued with the
reform process. A special request was made to
the Commonwealth and the UN, which saw the
arrival of two International Police teams under
the auspices of the Commonwealth Police
Development Task Force (CPDTF) and the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNOMSIL).
The teams included a number of experienced
Police Officers. It was probably an advantage
both that there were two groups of advisors
involved, and that the members of the two
groups were from a range of different countries.
The head of the Commonwealth Police
Taskforce, Keith Biddle was from the UK, as was
his deputy, Adrian Horn, and Chief Inspector
David Tingle, but the other members came from
Zimbabwe, Canada and Sri Lanka. The members
of UNOMSIL’s police teams hailed from
Namibia, Kenya, Norway, India and Malaysia.
Everyone… ‘had different experiences of policing
and worked with different models’ (Horn, quoted
in Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 31). This meant
that there was more commitment to developing a
model that was appropriate to the Sierra Leone
context. However, as the officers hailed mostly
from Commonwealth countries (former British
colonies), they did have one significant area of
policing in common – the tradition of a common
law, rather than civil law system.3
President Kabbah announced the Sierra Leone
Police Charter in August 1998, which established
the primacy of the police as providers of internal
security in Sierra Leone, and reiterated the
importance of police reform. Its overall aim was
‘to see a reborn Sierra Leone Police, which will
be a force for good in our Nation’ (Sierra Leone
Policing Charter 1998).
Unfortunately, these lofty ambitions were
summarily halted by an offensive on Freetown by
AFRC-RUF forces on 6 January 1999. Once
again they were repelled by a combination of
ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces (CDF)
troops but the offensive took its toll on both the
civilian population and the police, who were
targeted once more. 
The Criminal Investigations Department
Headquarters was burnt down, causing an
irrecoverable loss of documents, records, and
case files. Recently acquired equipment under
the funding assistance of UNOMSIL and the
CPDTF was either vandalised or looted. Within
48 hours of the invasion the number of police
vehicles was reduced from some 60 to five. An
estimated 250 Police Officers were killed, some
along with their families and dependents. About
164 million Leones meant for police salaries was
stolen from the Pay and Quarter Master’s
Offices at Police Headquarters; and the police
armoury in Kingtom4 looted (Charley 1999). 
The ‘January 6’ invasion, as it came to be known,
presented a huge setback, rendering the force
unable to perform its duties, even after the
invasion was repelled and calm restored.
Nevertheless, although peace would not be
definitive until 2000, the Kabbah government
returned to its ambitious task of reforming the
police, supported by its international partners.5
The single-most important action of immediate
significance was Kabbah’s interim appointment
of the Head of the CPDTF, Keith Biddle, a
retired Assistant Chief Constable from
Manchester, UK, as Sierra Leone’s interim
Inspector General of Police.
As problematic as the appointment may have
appeared, it proved a stroke of genius by the
Kabbah administration. By bringing in someone
with no political affiliation or attachments, the
government ensured that difficult decisions to
bring about change had a chance of being pushed
through. Moreover, it was important to
demonstrate to the populace a radical break
from the past. Further, most Sierra Leoneans felt
profound gratitude towards foreigners,6 and
particularly the British, after the UK’s military
intervention in 2000 brought the war to a
definitive end.7 Furthermore, the control of the
SLP by the British during the colonial period was
still part of many people’s living memory. While
it had served as an instrument of the colonial
government, it had at least been respected as a
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highly professional force. Given Sierra Leone’s
limited strategic importance to the UK
government, the appointment also had the
benefit of not appearing political or neocolonial.
Furthermore, reform-minded police were in
favour of the appointment, as the SLP did not
have anyone who would have provided credible
leadership at the time. As Sierra Leone is an
extremely neopatrimonial8 country, jobs and
opportunities often come down to who you know,
and who you are related to. This makes it very
difficult to hire and fire people at will, and can
make progress slow. A great advantage of having
a foreigner in place was that he could ignore
such machinations.
However, not all senior officers were on board: 
When the restructuring of the SLP came [it
was as if] we (all SLP officers) were all
standing on the platform… There were those
of us who were ready to jump on board this
[restructuring] train. There were those
standing in the middle very confused – should
I get on the train or not, what benefit am I
going to get from this? And then there was a
third group – I do not want change. I’m not
going to get on board this train. So we had…
[to] work hard to convince others to come on
board (Fakondo, interview, 2011).
Biddle pursued two tactics – one included
identifying reform-minded Police Officers to
work with. In doing so he ignored seniority – a
core aspect of a hierarchical organisation like the
police – in favour of his own perception of
competence. To this end, he identified a number
of relatively young people, promoted them and
sent them to the UK for training, to create a
reservoir of people who shared his vision.
The other tactic was to neutralise or get rid of
spoilers outright. He found ways to retire people
he felt he could not work with, by invoking a
clause within the civil service wherein the Head
of Department can retire staff from his
institution before they reach the age of
retirement, as long as valid reasons are given.
Other tactics included luring them out of the
organisation with secondments.9
Predictably, not all Biddle’s tactics were
particularly welcomed. His style was sometimes
reminiscent of the ‘divide and rule’ approach of
the colonial regime in the 1800s. Some competent,
reform-minded police that were not Biddle’s ‘blue-
eyed boys and girls’ were left out – particularly as
he focused on people who he perceived he could
work with (Charley, interview, 2010). Eventually,
however, he came to appreciate this group and
their abilities, and promoted them accordingly.
In any case, Biddle left in 2003, and was replaced,
on his recommendation, by Brima Acha Kamara.
Kabbah’s approval of the recommendation spoke
volumes about new attitudes to police
appointments, as Kamara was seen as aligned to
the main opposition party of the time, the All
People’s Congress (APC). It indicated that Biddle
had left a legacy that gave preference to
competence rather than seniority or political
affiliation. Kamara maintained and continued
many of Biddle’s reforms, successfully steering
the country through the 2007 elections, which
saw a peaceful change of government, from the
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) to the APC.
The election of Biddle’s protégés to the highest
office of the SLP continued with the appointment
of Francis Munu (who had served as Biddle’s
Operations Officer) to the position of IG in 2010.
Before he left, Biddle tried to ensure that the
group he had promoted was in place to continue
the work. He had sourced a number of senior
officers from the Cadet Officer Programme
described above, along with more recent
university graduates. The reform process
presented them with the opportunity to realise
the vision of the police they had joined years
before (interviews, Charley and Fakondo 2011).
Indeed, during the reform period, the Cadet
Officer squad made and continue to make up the
majority of the senior ranks of the Sierra Leone
Police, including AIGs Chris Charley and Kadi
Fakondo. The current IG, Francis Munu is also a
graduate of the programme.
4 Reform in practice
The reforms themselves were wide-ranging and
ambitious. Internally, efforts had to be made to
curb corruption and encourage the police to take
pride in their vocation. Externally, there was a
real need to strengthen civilian oversight of the
police, as well as to improve relations with the
public. Furthermore, the war had brought untold
destruction to police infrastructure and logistical
equipment. 
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 4  July 2012 53
The Research and Planning Department (R&P)
of the SLP led the way with the internal
restructuring process. In 1998 it sent out
questionnaires to serving personnel, soliciting
their views on what they wanted the police force
to look like, the limiting factors preventing them
from doing their jobs properly, and so on.
Suggestion boxes were put up at the various
police stations, successfully allowing more timid
personnel to make ‘faceless’ contributions.
The information gathered from the
questionnaires and suggestion boxes informed
the SLP strategic plan’s priority areas, with
projects accordingly introduced to achieve the
objectives. Since 1999, the strategic planning
cycle has been a major area of progress in the
way the SLP works, and contributes towards
SLP’s aim to get the best use out of the
organisation’s ‘scarce human, material and
financial resources’ (SLP 2008). It is a highly
participatory exercise, comprising performance
reviews, research on the operating environment,
and extensive consultation with stakeholders,
including members of the general public. 
Abridged versions of strategic planning
documents are now produced as standard, for
dissemination to the media, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and other stakeholders, so
they are aware of what the police are supposed to
be doing and can hold them to account. They are
also disseminated to the various divisions all over
the country, which are asked to regularly monitor
their progress towards achieving the plan. 
Another significant internal reform was the
establishment of the Executive Management
Board (EMB), comprising the IG, the Deputy
Inspector General and all the AIGs (there are
AIGs for each main department of the SLP:
Professional Standards; Operations; Crime
Services; Support Services; and Personnel
Training and Welfare, as well as for each of the
four regions – North, South, East and West).
Before the restructuring, management of the
police was a one-man show, headed by the
Inspector General of Police. Under the new
system, the EMB convenes weekly to discuss
strategic management and personnel decisions. 
There is a clear chain for disseminating decisions
made at Executive Board level, which its
members, the AIGs, are tasked with rolling out.
In the regions they are responsible for, AIGs
meet with their Local Unit Commanders (LUCs)
to discuss what has been decided on. The EMB
model is replicated at divisional level, with each
LUC heading a Tasking Coordination Group
(TCG), which they are expected to convene
regularly to review and plan policing within their
divisions. This chain is supplemented by Force
Orders (internal memoranda), and a lot of
information is disseminated by being read at
morning parades and so forth, ensuring that
decisions flow from top to bottom. 
Other significant changes pertain to
recruitment, retention, promotion and
remuneration policies. Prior to the restructuring,
corruption was rife in the recruitment of Police
Officers, with the result that many uneducated,
unqualified people joined the force. New
standards for basic recruits include: being a
Sierra Leone citizen; education at least until the
fourth grade; ability to pass a written exam in
English, Maths and General Studies; no criminal
record; mental and physical fitness (which
involves passing a medical that includes an HIV
test); and being between the ages of 18 and 25.
Efforts were made to ensure that Police Officers
were paid a living wage. Attention was also paid
to other non-remunerative factors, such as
ensuring officers were supplied with new
uniforms and boots.
A related reform, but one that proved extremely
unpopular, was the decision to change the
ranking structure, reducing the number of ranks
from 19 to nine. The previous bloated structure
had been very inefficient, making oversight and
decision-making difficult, distorting roles, and
hiding and allowing the promotion of incompetent
officers. 
The move came under a lot of criticism,
particularly as people in ranks that were phased
out were more often demoted to a lower rank
than promoted. Efforts were made, however, to
ensure those who lost out still remained
committed to the reform. For instance, the
frustrations of the officers whose ranks were
phased out were managed by ensuring that their
salaries did not change when they were demoted. 
Other internal control measures undertaken
involved the creation of specialised departments,
including (Charley 2008):
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z The Complaint, Discipline and Internal Investigation
Department, which deals with complaints from
members of the public against SLP personnel.
z The Internal Audit Department, which carries out
regular audits to ensure the organisation
adheres to financial and monetary regulations.
z The Corporate Service Department, which provides
technical advice, guidance and timely
information to help management to formulate
policies to allocate, manage, monitor and
control the use of SLP’s limited resources.
z The Equal Opportunity Department, which was
set up to ensure that every member of the
SLP enjoys equal opportunity irrespective of
age, sex, religion, tribe, etc.
Bottom-up policing was promoted through
extensive consultations with members of the
public at the start of the reform process, in town
and village meetings, public perception surveys,
and civil society consultations. Apart from the
Complaints Department, a variety of systems
and procedures were also put in place to
maintain good relations with the public. A
proactive Community Relations Department
works with communities. A Human Rights Unit
and Media and Public Relations Department
ensures that the public is both provided with
timely information about police activities and
supported to provide inputs to the Police
Strategy and activities. Members of the public
also have recourse to the Ombudsman.
Top-down oversight of the police was also
reformed, with the reinstitution of a Police
Council headed by the country’s Vice-President.
Its functions include advising the President on all
major matters of policy relating to internal
security, and (with the President’s approval)
making regulations related to the SLP’s
performance.
Additionally, a Parliamentary Oversight
Committee oversees the SLP’s activities and has
the power to question its operations. Parliament
also has the powers to summon SLP
management to give justifications for certain
actions or demands (Charley 2008: 115). 
4.1 Policing with and for the community
Early on it was recognised that the police would
not be able to maintain law and order by
themselves, and would require the assistance of
the wider community. However, there was a
conscious effort made to ensure that Sierra
Leone’s experience of Community Policing – an
approach strongly influencing the
Commonwealth Task Force, and particularly
espoused by its British members – was not
subject to preconceived notions of Community
Policing (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).10
Sierra Leone’s experience was not only different
from what the task force members had
experienced before, it was also clear that different
parts of the country were going to require
different types of community engagement. In
some areas, people were only familiar with
traditional forms of authority. Further, some areas
had been under RUF control for years, while in
other communities CDF fighters had taken over
the provision of security, and maintaining law and
order. Therefore, a system was needed that was
flexible enough to engage with these different
needs in different communities. 
Charley experienced this while attempting to
consolidate police presence in the Southern
Province, a region where (1) Civil Defence Forces
(in this region known as Kamajors)11 had taken
over responsibility for maintaining law and order
in some areas and (2) traditional authority held
sway in others:
The Kamajors were formed of the people and
had fought to re-establish freedom and
security in various regions. They were widely
respected and believed themselves to have a
legitimate claim to managing security… After
the war, the Kamajors were trusted, the police
were not… Although the Kamajors were not
the legitimate body to administer justice we
still needed to work with them. They had been
there when we were nowhere in sight… By
inviting their representatives [in Bo] to
shadow our investigation branch they were
able to see the extent to which the SLP had
been reformed in terms of accountability and
professionalism. Working in cooperation with
the Kamajors had the benefit of not only
inducting them into police procedure but also
of empowering them to register and process
members of their group who had committed
crimes. This alliance developed further into
an arrangement whereby the Kamajors were
allowed to access their members after formal
processing and administer civil justice in cases
we deemed to be less serious, for example
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domestic rather than criminal cases…
[G]radually everyone from both sides agreed
that it was working; on our part, the police
were transparent in their dealings,
accountable to the public and the Kamajors
worked within the parameters of their
cooperative role until we were finally able to
take complete control of administering law
and order in Bo (compiled from information
provided by Charley during interview, 2011).
Another example, with regard to traditional
authority:
One experience that highlights the
importance of policing in tandem with
traditional authority, involve[ed] a particularly
sensitive case concerning a girl aged about
seven. Her mother came to the police
distraught, to report that her daughter had
been abducted and initiated into the Bondo
society. Although formal arms of the law rarely
get involved in traditional practices, in this
case, the mother was reporting an abduction,
which the police could not ignore. However, as
serious an offence as kidnapping was, and the
forced initiation of the girl represented human
rights abuse, it was still a particularly sensitive
issue because it involved complex traditional
law… in this case it was essential to ‘think
outside the box’ due to the power of the Bondo
Society12 – as much guardians of culture as of
community – in Sierra Leone traditions. My
knowledge of local customs dictated that the
obvious course of action would be to approach
the Paramount Chief… the ultimate judge in
all family disputes, and final authority in all
traditional, ceremonial and domestic
matters… In areas of limited police presence,
the paramount authority and their chiefdom
police are responsible for maintaining law and
order… After listening to a report of the
situation, the Chief explained that no
initiation could take place without the
knowledge of the Chief Sowie,13 and he
summoned her immediately. She denied all
knowledge of the initiation… It was thus
deduced that this particular ‘Bondo Bush’ had
been arranged outside of the traditional
convention, by a woman who had ascribed to
herself the title and power of a Sowie.14
However, whether sanctioned or not, the self-
elected Sowie was still a Bondo member, and
well-respected in the community. Moreover
the Bondo Bush is taboo to men, so male
Police Officers could hardly storm in to rescue
the girls she was initiating. The best way to
justify a police intrusion would be on medical
grounds, due to the girls having been initiated
outside the traditional context without
appropriate oversight… I approached the
Chief Medical Officer at the Bo hospital in
search of a female nurse who could not only
handle any potential medical problems but
who was also a member of the Bondo Society.
The Chief Ward Sister fit these requirements
and agreed to accompany the police team.
Female Police Officers under command were
gathered and the situation explained. Anyone
who was not a society member was excused
from the mission… although they had already
been initiated, we were successful in rescuing
the girls from the grossly unhygienic
conditions in which they were being kept
(compiled from information provided by
Charley during interview 2011). 
These examples demonstrate the fine balance
that needs to be struck between a responsibility
to serve the public, highly sensitive political and
cultural interests, and power of traditional
authorities. The latter case also highlights the
necessity of working with other institutions, such
as the medical profession, in the SLP’s effort to
safeguard the security of citizens.
Given the need to ensure the effective operation
of the police, it was clear that a system of
policing, with community engagement at the
centre, was necessary. Local Needs Policing
(LNP) was developed as a way of capturing the
locale-specific nature of policing required, but
one that could be delivered within a ‘national
framework of standards and guidelines’
(Albrecht and Jackson 2009: 32).
The main structure driving LNP is the Local
Policing Partnership Board (LPPB), a
partnership between the SLP and the community
in each of Sierra Leone’s 32 police divisions. It is
coordinated by the LUC but the board is
populated by upstanding members of the
community from different walks of life, including
Paramount Chiefs, religious leaders, women’s
group leaders and so on (a member of the police
is normally involved in the capacity of secretary,
to ensure that meetings are well documented;
some capacity training is also provided). The
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LPPB comprises a Chair (who also sits on the
TCG) and members that coordinate joint
patrols, and get involved in neighbourhood
watch, intelligence gathering, and so on. 
While LPPBs vary from division to division, some
are extremely proactive, and have been very
helpful in supporting the police in their work.
Their activities are varied: they help decide
which issues the police should prioritise; they
highlight areas of high crime and where more
resources need to be applied; members inspect
police cells; and they support their local police
units by lobbying MPs on their behalf. The police
believe LPPBs are one of the reasons that the
public’s confidence in them has grown. 
While Police Officers are present in an estimated
80 per cent of the country, few are deployed in
remote areas. LPPBs, however, tend to be
present in even the most remote areas and stand
in for the police (although all perpetrators they
catch are still handed over to the police as soon
as possible). While the LPPB is at division-level,
divisions are further sub-divided into smaller
communities. These coordinate Community
Safety Volunteers (CSVs) – able-bodied men and
women in good standing with the community
(recommended by the community and further
vetted by the police). CSVs help the police by
regularly patrolling their neighbourhoods. They
are easily identified by vests provided by the
police, and are empowered to conduct citizens’
arrests. It is important to note that they are not
vigilantes. In fact, one indication that there is
increased trust in and collaboration between
communities and the police are the increased
numbers of arrested people that are being
brought to the police after citizen arrests, rather
than the community dealing with it themselves
(e.g. through mob justice). 
As indicated above, a range of new departments
were introduced to ensure that reforms were
taken forward and sustained. However, other
departments were created after the fact – arising
from specific needs stemming from the
particularities of the post-conflict environment.
One such department was the Family Support
Unit (FSU), established in 2001 to respond to
cases relating to sexual and gender-based
violence. The FSU grew out of the Domestic
Violence Unit (DVU) started at Kissi police
station (in the east end of Freetown) where Kadi
Fakondo was based just after the conflict ended.
Women, including ‘bush wives’ (girls and women
who had been abducted during the conflict)
started coming in to report rape and other
abuses. Unable to address the issues within the
existing structure the Fakondo set up the DVU
(Fakondo, interview, 2011; Fakondo 2009). This
was scaled up as the FSU with the support of
external consultants, and piloted in Freetown.
The idea caught like wildfire and was quickly
rolled out across the country. Police Officers and
social workers were trained by the
commonwealth team, with DFID providing
funding. The FSU also worked closely with the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and
other NGOs such as the International Rescue
Committee (IRC).15
5 Challenges and the road ahead
Despite the sweeping changes outlined above,
many questions remain. In the face of dwindling
international support and interest, how
sustainable will the reforms described above be?
In a country still riddled with corruption at all
levels of government, how immune is the SLP? In
a context in which the public is increasingly
dissatisfied with their levels of public service,
how engaged with local needs policing will they
continue to be?
A number of the challenges facing the police
were well documented by Al Shek Kamara, a
former Chief Superintendent of Police, in his
essay that formed part of his application for
promotion to the rank of AIG in 2005, titled
‘Future Challenges facing the Sierra Leone
Police Force’. 
Referring to the community policing strategy,
Kamara (2005: 15) noted that it ‘is yet to gain
full acceptance by a good number of… police
personnel who are merely paying lip service to
it’. As with many reforms it is not easy to change
things overnight, and ‘attempting to switch from
a highly centralised, authoritarian structure to a
decentralised, democratic approach in a
relatively short period of time is… a difficult
undertaking’ (ibid.).
Further, changing the rank and file’s attitude
towards the discharging of their duty probably
remains one of the greatest challenges to the
reform process. This is exacerbated by the fact
that despite efforts to improve conditions of
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service, their pay and benefits remain relatively
low. With ever decreasing international support,
the concern is that invariably, old practices will
start creeping back in. 
Police discipline and honesty remain a huge issue.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the traffic
management department of the police who
interface with the public all day, every day.
Accordingly, their (mis)conduct is amplified as
representative of the whole police force –
evidenced by public perception surveys (Vincent
2008) but, according to senior officers, it is more
perception than reality, as police statistics show
increasing numbers of traffic fines being paid –
indicating that traffic police are not being paid off
to turn a blind eye but are actually fining
offenders and charging them to court. In fact, the
police bring significant amounts of money to the
national coffers in the form of accruals from fines.
Furthermore, corrupt practices are no longer
condoned, as in the past. That they are a reality is
recognised by the police management, but it is
fighting hard to address the problem. There are
severe repercussions for anyone caught taking
bribes. Also, there are now structures in place
within the institution (such as the complaints
division) where people who are aggrieved by
unfair police practice can make complaints. 
Police training tries to play its part – extensive
courses are taught on ethics. However, whether
this becomes internalised depends on the cadre
of the individual being taught, and recruitment
procedures, despite stricter eligibility
requirements, remain problematic. Kamara states:
A good number of recruits have found their
way into the organisation by presenting fake
documents indicating educational
qualification and age… Yet these people are
allowed into the organisation because of
influence and cover-up by some unscrupulous
personnel involved in the selection process. If
this situation is not closely monitored… the
organisation will soon be overwhelmed with a
bunch of old semi-literates akin to the
political era and unfit for the demands of
community policing (Kamara 2005: 12).
Another problem regarding recruitment is the
difficulty in attracting female graduates from
the universities and other tertiary institutions.
Efforts to overcome this include outreach
programmes at universities and the accelerated
female graduate scheme, in operation since 2007
(Elizabeth Turay, interview, 2011).
Maintaining a commitment to the range of
reforms discussed above and continuing their
spread across the country, while ensuring
adequate logistics and infrastructure, has
colossal financial implications. There is a big
question as to what happens when donor funding
runs out, which apart from for particular
activities – such as providing support for policing
elections – it is more or less doing. This is in a
context where the police force needs to grow
from its current capacity of 9,500 to a 12,000-
strong force to ensure effectiveness.
As largely negative public perceptions indicate, it
has been a real challenge to manage the public’s
expectations. Senior Police Officers feel that the
force is being judged against Biddle’s success.
During his time, however, the force was
inundated with resources that allowed the police
to be professional in both its outlook and its
service delivery. The nine years since he left have
coincided with donor fatigue, or donor diversion
to other areas, both within Sierra Leone, and to
other post-conflict countries. The reduced
assistance to the organisation has invariably had
an impact on both its professionalism and its
ability to respond to crimes.
Other challenges arising from the lack of funds
is the force’s capacity to actually fight crime,
particularly the more sophisticated forms of
criminality it is increasingly faced with, such as
cybercrime; money laundering; drug smuggling;
and human trafficking. The force continues to
lag behind in technological advancements,
including computer, forensic and CCTV
technology, severely affecting its abilities
(Kamara 2005). Furthermore, limited funds
make it difficult for the police to address issues
stemming from the recent history of conflict.
This includes the challenge of the large number
of disaffected, war-hardened youth concentrated
in the main cities and towns, who often resort to
illicit activities to fund their existence.
The government has been grappling with its own
lack of revenue, meaning its assistance to the
police has not been very robust or timely, which
impairs the force’s well-laid strategic plans.
There will definitely be a need to juggle
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budgetary allocations, and prioritise some areas
(e.g. training) over others (e.g. vehicle
purchases). Alternative means of raising revenue,
such as the private hire of police services by
businesses such as banks are in place but these
are potentially problematic (e.g. if conflicts of
interest arise) (Lance Phoday, interview, 2011). 
The IG continues to be appointed by the
President (although there is now wide
consultation during this process) and supervised
by the Minister of Internal Affairs; the Police
Council is chaired by the Vice-President; and the
government controls the purse strings. The set-
up continues to provide the facility for a corrupt
political party, or individuals with oversight
responsibilities, to levy undue influence over the
keeper of the SLP’s highest office. 
With the change of government (from SLPP to
APC), there was some worry that the police’s
newly-acquired independence would be eroded,
and when they came in, some senior politicians
tried to throw their weight around. But key
ministers such as the former Minister of Internal
Affairs, Dauda Kamara were instrumental
(although ultimately unsuccessful) in trying to
create an independent authority to supervise the
police, outside of government machinery.
Although not yet a reality, the proposal remains
under review. However, it remains a contentious
issue, not just in or for Sierra Leone, but also in
other countries. After all, control over the use of
force remains a key sovereign function of the
state. What is the wisdom then of putting the
police under the supervision of an independent
authority?
In that case, it may be enough to ensure that the
appropriate checks and balances remain in place.
So for instance, while the appointment of the IG
and their deputy are still political appointments,
which may disfavour more experienced and
capable AIGs who are not preferred by politicians,
the appointments are now made after wide-
ranging consultations such that there is no
longer scope for arbitrary appointments within
the democratic system. Nevertheless, a recent
constitutional review recommended that the
appointment of the IG should be an independent
from government. 
One problematic aspect of the way the reform in
Sierra Leone took place is that it focused on the
police, largely in isolation – so it was only recently
for instance that prison reform was undertaken.
The JSDP has gone a long way in redressing this
but the time lag has been problematic for the
successful performance of the police. 
A new IG took over in August 2010, and perhaps
the time has come for the police to review, nearly
ten years later, the impact and relevance of the
restructuring. For instance, (some officers feel)
the institution would benefit from reintroducing
one rank within the junior ranking structure, and
another in the senior ranking structure, to
manage people’s expectations. 
8 Conclusions
This article has tried to tell a story about
organisational change, from the perspectives of
senior Sierra Leonean officers who were in the
middle of efforts to see the change through, and
who today have the responsibility of maintaining
it.
They face significant challenges, however.
Perception surveys (e.g. Vincent 2008) have
shown that while the public does think the police
force has improved, it is still widely considered a
corrupt institution. As much as the restructuring
has been embraced, there are still officers who
have refused to change. At the same time, some
members of the public are still on the fence – not
everybody appreciates the police (sometimes, the
police feel, no matter what they do!). As with any
war, there is always the aftermath to contend
with; high rates of unemployment, particularly
among young people, means high crime rates to
deal with, community conflicts and so on.
Furthermore, detractors worry that not enough
has changed, and in fact the ground that has
been won is already being eroded. With ever-
decreasing sources of funding will progress be
completely erased?
Senior Police Officers assert that they are
working hard to ensure that they provide the
necessary services, and will continue to do so, as
long as essential funding is forthcoming. The
government’s role is therefore vital. Public
security needs to be a priority of the government.
While it is understandable that the government
is constrained, security provision must not be
compromised. A positive note however, is that
lack of funds notwithstanding, the government’s
commitment to the process has been maintained.
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Despite the change in the governing party there
is official commitment to maintaining the
police’s operational independence (although
there is evidence that this is eroding somewhat).
The upcoming (2012) elections will prove an
important test of police independence.
Finally, the Sierra Leone experience shows the
need for reform to be a society-wide endeavour.
This is most apparent with regard to one of the
police’s most persistent problems: corruption.
Corruption is society-wide – one could almost
label it a cultural problem, pervading homes,
families, churches, schools, etc. and tackling it
requires a holistic approach. In 2008, the
government adopted an official national policy of
‘Attitudinal Change’, which includes the notion
that the public must accept and address the role
it plays in facilitating corruption, including
among the police. It also reinforces the notion
that improved policing in Sierra Leone must be a
community effort.
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Notes
1 The article was written by Assistant Inspector
General (AIG) Chris Charley and Freida
M’Cormack. Freida also interviewed Chris
Charley, AIGs Kadi Fakondo and Elizabeth
Turay, and Lance Phoday, head of the SLP’s
Corporate Services over a period of five weeks
in December 2010 and January 2011 in Sierra
Leone. The information provided in the
interviews was verified by/referenced using
previous research on police reform in Sierra
Leone. (Interview dates: Charley, 20
December 2010 and 6 January 2011; Fakondo,
10 January 2011; Turay, 6 January 2011;
Phoday, 8 January 2011). 
2 The Sierra Leone Civil War began in 1991,
when a rebel group, the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) invaded the country from
neighbouring Liberia. Although the RUF
claimed they were fighting to free Sierra
Leoneans from the ills of the Sierra Leone
government, the atrocities they committed
belied their claims. In the face of the army’s
inability to defend the country, other parties,
including community defence groups and
regional peacekeepers were drawn into the
war. After numerous failed peace agreements,
two military coups, a palace coup and a
transition to democratic governance, the war
finally ended in 2002.
3 Common law systems trace their history to
England, while civil law systems trace their
history to Roman law and the French
Napoleonic code. Common law systems place
great weight on court decisions and common
law courts have the authority to make law
where no legislative statute exists. By
contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, courts lack
authority to act where there is no statute, and
judicial precedent is given less interpretive
weight.
4 An area in Freetown.
5 Reform would have been impossible without
the sustained provision of funds by
international donors, mainly through the
Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform
Programme (SILSEP, 1999–2008) and the
Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP,
2004–2009). Most of this has been from DFID,
channelled through the CPDTF but support
has also been received from other bilateral
donors, the UN ECOWAS. In addition to the
police, under SILSEP, support was also
provided to the Office of National Security, the
Central Intelligence and Security Unit, the
Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs and
a range of institutions with an interest in
accountability and enhanced service delivery
across the security sector (parliament, civil
society, media and academia) (Biesheuvel et al.
2007). The JSDP additionally provided support
to the justice sector.
6 Kabbah similarly appointed Nigerian
ECOMOG Commander Maxwell Kobe as his
Chief of Defence Staff. After Kobe died under
mysterious circumstances, a street in the
nation’s third city Kenema (where ECOMOG
helped prevent the RUF from taking over)
was named after him, and his memory kept
alive through popular song and remembered
gratitude.
7 In May 2000, RUF soldiers captured 500 UN
peacekeepers, who were part of the provisions
of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement. The
situation that followed threatened to reignite
the conflict and British troops promptly
arrived to evacuate their own and other
foreign nationals, but also engaged and
subdued rebel elements. An 800-strong
contingent remained to support the UN
peacekeepers and support the reconstitution
of the Sierra Leone Army.
8 The concept of neopatrimonialism is derived
from Weber’s definition of patrimonialism,
whereby authority is ascribed to a person
rather than an office-holder, who is firmly
anchored in a social and political order, in a
system held together by loyalty or kinship ties
rather than hierarchical administrative grades
and functions (Clapham 1985).
9 This incuded Kandeh Bangura, the Deputy IG
who had bravely safeguarded police interests
during the AFRC regime: although reform-
minded, and highly regarded by SLP officers,
he still belonged to the old school and fearing
being retired by Biddle, became more
concerned with personal survival than
spearheading reforms. 
10 The main elements of Community Policing
include: policing directed by community
engagement; devolution of responsibilities to
officers on the ground; partnership with other
agencies and local authorities in securing the
public’s interest and resolving problems; a
proactive (rather than reactive) approach to
problem solving; and an orientation towards
maintaining peace rather than enforcing the
law (Mackenzie and Henry 2009). 
11 During the war, in the face of the double
threat from both the RUF and rogue elements
of the Sierra Leone Army, many communities
mobilised their own civil militias (mostly
derived from traditional hunting societies).
Although now collectively known as Kamajors,
the actual term is a specific reference to the
militias that formed in the south and the east
of the country, mostly in Bo District. They
successfully repelled the RUF from Bo, Sierra
Leone’s second city, and subsequently set
themselves up as police, judge and jury,
arresting, imprisoning and even executing
suspected criminals.
12 The Bondo Society in Sierra Leone is widely
revered. A girl is initiated into the Bondo
society through seclusion in the Bondo ‘Bush’,
by way of a female circumcision and other
rites of passage into womanhood. It is a
common practice throughout Sierra Leone. It
is also a highly political issue, demonstrated
by the fact that despite international
campaigns and pressure from rights activists,
politicians have been reluctant to oppose, and
in fact have continued to endorse the practice,
for fear of losing the support of its powerful
champions (Afrol 2002).
13 The chief female initiator, a very powerful
figure in traditional society.
14 She was likely motivated by the fact that
Bondo is a lucrative business; much is spent
on the associated celebrations and Sowies are
paid handsomely for their services.
15 Training and support was sponsored by the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL), the Civilian Police, the
Department for International Development
(DFID), the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR),
UNICEF, the IRC, the Ministry of Social
Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and
other agencies.
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